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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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March 4, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting - Cuba

Here is some miscellaneous information with regard to your Special Group meeting this afternoon on Cuba.

1. Artine Cut-off - As you know, State is pressing to cut off Artine, largely because of his recent irresponsible activity. CIA opposes State on this one for the usual reasons. DOD, reportedly, will also take a somewhat reluctant line on cutting off Artine. Vance may express the view that a cutoff will drive Artine up the wall and that he will go off and do something that could cause us real trouble vis-a-vis our present conflict with the East. For example, he might go off and sink a Soviet ship. DOD would probably prefer that we phase him out slowly and keep a dialogue going over the course of the next few months. The advantage of this would be twofold - First, it would keep Artine quiet; second, his residual power to hurt us, when we finally do cut him off, will be reduced.

On this one, I am inclined towards the DOD view.

(b) (1) (b) (4) (c)

2. Pesticides - The CIA will probably propose a deal whereby we arrange to have diluted Cuban pesticides. State and DOD are both likely to oppose this one for such reasons as the following: First, it will mean going to the Dutch Government; it is questionable whether we want to bring up such a proposal with that government, especially if we think the odds are high that we will be turned down. Second, there is the moral issue of whether or not we should dilute pesticides which were given to the Cubans during the prisoner exchange. Third, it would be highly embarrassing if this one ever leaked out from one of the many bases that would have to be touched.

I don't like this one either.

3. Support to RECE - One question which will arise today is whether or not to start giving some low-risk support to RECE. While State and DOD, at the working levels, originally were in favor of it, they seem to have changed their position. One reason - some of the arguments which are spelled out in the

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Mr. Bundy

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attached memo on the subject. Another reason - State does not want to compromise its position on Artime (i.e., If you give aid to RECE, how can you still give aid to Artime?).

State and DOD will probably propose that, in turning down RECE, we give them \$17,000. The RECE people apparently had to tap a program fund of its small contributors to keep going administratively over the last couple months when Bosch cut them off; they want to return this money to the small contributors. Arguments in favor of giving them the money are: (a) it will lessen the shock of giving RECE a negative reply, (b) they will not look bad among the exiles (we don't want them to look bad because they are "good guys"), and (c) part of RECE's problem has not been their fault. We have not been able to give RECE as prompt an answer as we would have liked.

I continue to be in favor of not getting involved with RECE; I agree that \$17,000 is a small price to pay for a kiss-off.

4. Keating Gimmick - Both DOD and State are cold to the idea of having Keating (I understand this now may be changed to Donovan) stir up trouble between the Soviets and the Cubans. DOD feels that such goings-on might be interpreted as some sort of Vietnam play. State feels that such a man wouldn't get received at a high level; also, there are other ways to do the job if it needs doing.

While I admire CLA's ingenuity and I sincerely think we should keep them invention-minded, I must say that this one sounds like a Rube Goldberg contraption. I am against it.

5. CIA's Paramilitary Capability - Both DOD and State will probably oppose CIA's proposal to drop its paramilitary capability. I agree with State and DOD that, with the present world situation as it stands, this is a good capability to keep on hand if we possibly can. I would agree to an abandonment of this capability only if it were demonstrated that we could crank it up again in a very short space of time.

*GC*  
Gordon Chase

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